This article forms part of a series of think pieces to be released by the Ateneo Bangsamoro Initiative of the School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University. The series is intended to contribute to the ongoing discourse on governance and development in the Bangsamoro region.
March 27, 2026 is the 12th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). The CAB is translated into law, the Bangsamoro Organic Law of 2018. The ratification of BOL in 2019 officially created the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
The first election in BARMM was supposed to happen in 2022. It was postponed and rescheduled to May 2025 – the reason for postponement was largely due to pandemic recovery. From May 2025, it was again rescheduled to Oct 2025. Then, the Supreme Court issued the ruling that removes Sulu from BARMM. Elections was again postponed to March 2026. We are now in the middle of March. The House of Representatives has recently proposed a new schedule – September 14, 2026.
While election plays a key role in establishing political legitimacy in BARMM, it is also a critical component of the normalization process. Normalization is the term used vis a vis the demobilization of arms and forces, and reintegration of armed combatants to civilian life. In peace literature, this is also referred as DDR, or Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. While political agreements formalize the political and legal commitments of negotiating parties in the pursuit of political power, the normalization process seeks to eliminate the use of armed violence as a means of advancing group interests. This is why the normalization process is arguably the most critical component of the peace process. Political opposition is a normal and legitimate feature of democratic governance; however, no group should retain the armed capability to undermine the political authority of the state. Normalization seeks to remove arms from politics by ensuring that political competition takes place through democratic institutions rather than violence.
The normalization process agreed upon by the GPH and MILF is designed as a series of phased and synchronized measures. The phased approach is designed to reinforce mutual confidence among the parties and facilitate a stable transition of conflict-affected communities toward civilian life. Key political commitments will trigger the MILF decommissioning - that is, the turning-in of weapons and the transition of fighters back into civilian life.
Under this arrangement, the passage and ratification of the BOL trigger Phase 1, during which 30 percent of MILF combatants are to be decommissioned. Phase 2 commences once the BARMM government becomes operational, with the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) assuming governance functions; Phase 2 also requires the rollout of socioeconomic development programs in conflict-affected communities. Once Phase 2 commitments are fulfilled, an additional 35 percent of MILF combatants are to be decommissioned.
Phase 3 involves the decommissioning of the remaining 35 percent of combatants, which is contingent upon the holding of elections and the establishment of a duly elected Bangsamoro government. This is where we are now in the decommissioning process.
Based on data from the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity (OPAPRU), 26,145 combatants have been decommissioned as of 2025, representing phases 1 and 2, or about 65% of the 40,000 MILF combatants to be decommissioned.
On July 26, 2025, The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) issued a resolution, declaring that decommissioning of its forces will not proceed; “the decommissioning of the remaining 14,000 MILF combatants and 2,450 weapons shall commence only upon the substantial compliance of the GPH in the other tracks of normalization, including the provision of socio-economic package as agreed upon by the GPH and MILF Peace Implementing Panels to the 26,145 combatants,” the resolution stated.
This MILF declaration, and the repeated delays in the BARMM election, pose serious hurdle to the progress of normalization. Many of these challenges stem from weak institutional coordination, misaligned systems and processes, limited bureaucratic appreciation of the urgency of service delivery in conflict-affected areas, procedural red tape, and the reluctance of agencies to act decisively for fear of adverse findings from audit bodies.
Civil society groups have expressed concern over growing uncertainty and its potential impact on the trust of both the parties and affected communities in the MILF peace process. Some organizations have also reminded the public that the peace process is a shared responsibility among all stakeholders involved.
While it is true that the peace process is fundamentally co-owned by the GPH and MILF, some practical implications of this co-ownership need to be asked: What level of shared responsibility in program implementation is acceptable to both parties? To what extent should the MILF, as a non-state actor, exercise influence and/or control over the implementation of programs arising from the agreement? Does co-ownership necessarily imply equal accountability of both parties, particularly when programs fail or fall short of expectations? Given that audit and oversight institutions have direct jurisdiction over state agencies but limited authority over non-state actors, how can accountability mechanisms be structured to ensure equitable standards for both?
Do the parties fully appreciate the institutional nuances of an autonomous arrangement operating under a parliamentary system? While elements of political autonomy are clearly present in the BARMM, the development of administrative autonomy aligned with a parliamentary structure remains a challenge. For example, local development programming and planning in BARMM still largely follow templates designed by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). Similarly, the management of public services - like education, health, and infrastructure - continues to mirror the systems and procedures of their respective national agencies. Financial management systems intended to ensure accountability and transparency also remain underdeveloped. It is important to note that government Departments in the Philippines operate within a Presidential system characterized by strong central government; therefore their institutional processes are designed to conform to that structure. This creates inherent tensions when such systems are applied within an autonomous region intended to function under a parliamentary system.
These concerns must be addressed, or at the very least expectations must be clarified, in order to resolve misunderstandings and manage the demands that may impede progress in the peace process. The normalization process must be brought back on track. The presence of approximately 14,000 armed ex-combatants represents a significant force that requires careful management. Moreover, narratives can powerfully shape perceptions and mobilize action. Prolonged delays in delivery of commitments and a loss of momentum in decommissioning risk creating perceptions of institutional indifference and state neglect - conditions that opportunistic groups may exploit to recruit supporters and potentially reignite armed rebellion.
The peace process opened political space that allowed state institutions to rebuild legitimacy in conflict-affected areas in BARMM; it also provided the MILF an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to represent and advance the interests of the communities it claims to serve. Preserving this space now requires sustained political will, institutional coordination, and shared accountability to ensure that the hard-won gains of the peace process are not reversed
A condensed version of this article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. See: https://opinion.inquirer.net/190446/the-bangsamoro-crucible
Dr. Jennifer S. Oreta is the Dean of the Ateneo School of Government. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Ateneo de Manila University.