The eminence of the Chief Executive in the constitutional order of the Philippines gave rise to the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the “alter-ego of the President” principle. This legal concept is defined by the Supreme Court in Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409 (February 14, 1992) as follows:
“Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
And from this notion of a “single executive” evolved the “pleasuring the President” dogma, which fundamentally means that presidential appointees in the executive branch (particularly Department Secretaries) hold their posts at the complete sufferance of their boss. This legal principle has become a chronically abused excuse to cling on a little bit more to one’s office. In most cases, much to the displeasure of the public.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency and the pleasuring the executive principle are not applicable in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Because Section 3, Article I of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) provides, “The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall have a parliamentary form of government.”
A major change that must be highlighted here is that the Chief Minister in the BARMM is not directly elected by the people unlike the Regional Governor of its predecessor the ARMM. Crucially, this innovation brings forth a totally alien dynamic because people will not only be voting for a representative in the Bangsamoro Parliament, but they will also be indirectly voting for the potential Chief Minister. Hence, BARMM voters must not only consider the candidate’s own suitability but also the credibility of his political party or his affiliation to potential Chief Ministers.
In a parliamentary system, the majority party or a coalition of parties in the parliament elects the head of the executive branch of government, usually called the Prime Minister. Unlike a President, a Prime Minister is deemed “primus inter pares” or “first among equals” because ultimately, he is also just an elected member of the parliament. In the BARMM context, the Chief Minister is just one of 80 elected members of the Bangsamoro Parliament.
The executive branch in a parliamentary system is called the cabinet. In the BARMM it is called the government of the day. It is composed of select members of the parliament who function as the heads of the various ministries and departments responsible for putting into action the laws passed by parliament (the legislative branch of government).
The principle of responsible government is the parliamentary mechanism that ensures the cabinet or the government of the day does not abuse its power. Hence, it mandates the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, to be directly answerable to the parliament.
So first, the ministers that comprise the government of the day are not the “alter-egos” of the Chief Minister. The members of parliament who are part of the cabinet essentially stand on the same footing in the sense that all of them are directly accountable to the Parliament. It is worth emphasizing at this point that although cabinet ministers are appointed by the Chief Minister, this appointment fundamentally differs from the ones the President makes in the exercise of his appointing power.
In this vein, the pleasuring the president principle also does not apply for these ministers and therefore cannot be used as a shield against calls for their removal from their post. Conversely however, the Chief Minister does not have the power of control over the cabinet ministers. Meaning, he cannot unilaterally set aside a decision or action of a minister and substitute his own determination on a particular issue or concern.
In fact, a vital corollary to the principle of responsible government is the principle of ministerial responsibility, which means that ministers are solely and totally responsible for the actions and decisions of the government departments they lead. Again, they do not act as “alter-egos” of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister in the case of the BARMM. This principle is another fundamental parliamentary mechanism that aims to encourage ministers to keep a close check on their department's activities. Ministers are thus expected to answer questions and be accountable for the actions of their departments during parliamentary committee hearings.
Truth be told, these fundamental parliamentary mechanisms discussed here are probably more effective in implementing the prescription in Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution that, “Public office is a public trust.” They are indeed, pillars of good governance in a parliamentary system of government. Hence, it is incumbent upon the Bangsamoro community to internalize these foundational parliamentary principles.
Obviously, the task of building a unique Bangsamoro parliamentary tradition from the ground up starts with the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). Admittedly, this job is made even harder by a resilient presidentialism mindset. Hence, it is incumbent upon the BTA to consciously and purposefully depart from the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency and the pleasuring the executive principle.
Of particular urgency in this regard is how the Chief Minister and the government of the day perform their duties and go about their day-to-day work. At this point, they should already be adhering to parliamentary principles and protocols. Hence, the Bangsamoro public must be able to see them putting into action the principle of responsible government and the principle of ministerial responsibility.
Indeed, the BTA must intentionally display the application of these parliamentary principles in fulfilling their mandate. Presently, it is commendable that the various ministries are very active in meeting the demands of the Bangsamoro people. Even as a parliament, the BTA has been visibly committed in producing bills that address the problems afflicting the BARMM.
However, the BTA can do more in subjecting these ministries to parliamentary oversight. The BTA as a parliament must not be seen as simply rubber stamping every decision and action of the government of the day. And neither should it be viewed as tolerating the inaction of the cabinet on important matters concerning the BARMM.
The reality is, if the BTA simply mirrors the “business as usual” of the national government, especially how Congress seems content with being subservient to the President, then it will just be very difficult to prevent the BARMM from being labelled as another “failed experiment”.
Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco, LL.M is a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Ateneo School of Government. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Access Bangsamoro, its proponents, or affiliates.