The 80 members of the re-organized Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) commenced regular sessions this year as a parliament with “no majority and no minority”, as stated by the retained Chief Minister, Ahod “Al Haj Murad” Ebrahim.
This is indeed a controversial change considering that as per Section 3, Article I of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), “The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall have a parliamentary form of government.” This new governance structure is a huge departure from the previous regional government framework which followed the presidential system.
If the BTA were simply a transition mechanism, then this new “one BTA” ethos would have been a well-considered adjustment. A centralized decision-making structure could mean efficiency in fulfilling its deliverables. It would also be more aligned with its administrative nature as an agency attached to the Office of the President.
But the BTA is not merely an administrative office tasked to oversee the transition. The BOL has empowered the BTA to function as a parliament as well, as per Section 3 of Article XVI. In fact, the two iterations of the BTA have been functioning already as the Bangsamoro Parliament.
The establishment of a parliamentary form of government in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is by design. Hence, it is only natural to conclude that the BTA itself is integral to the process of learning about this new government system. And it is not just the political class getting acclimated to the parliamentary ways of governance, but also the Bangsamoro people gaining familiarity with the new system.
It is worth noting that the fundamental goal in instituting a ministerial or parliamentary system is to facilitate a more collective approach to regional governance. The expectation is that this framework can then steer governance in the BARMM away from the strongman-style mentality that was pervading in the presidential-style government structure of the ARMM. Pertinently, the majority-minority party dynamic is central to the parliamentary system of government.
As per Section 4 of Rule VI of the BTA Rules, the “minority” seems to have been designated the role of the opposition in the parliamentary context, to wit:
“All Members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority who voted in favor of the Speaker shall be considered part of the Majority. All others shall be part of the Minority.
Members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority who shall be appointed after the election of the Speaker shall have the right to choose membership either in the Majority and the Minority through an oral or written manifestation to the Speaker.
The Majority and the Minority shall elect their respective Majority Leader and the Minority Leader from among their members.”
Therefore, to set aside the majority-minority dynamic in the BTA seems fundamentally inconsistent with the intent of the BOL and the parliamentary rules instituted by the original BTA. Indeed, a “one BTA” philosophy seems more consistent with the strongman-style of governance which many members of the current BTA are so vigorously against.
It is worth mentioning at this point that Section 5 of Rule I of the Parliamentary Rules, Procedures, and Practices of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority encapsulates the very parliamentary ethos that must be ingrained now in the BARMM by the BTA:
“It is the purpose of this Rule to ascertain the will of the majority, to preserve the rights of the minority, and to facilitate the orderly conduct of business in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority. Towards this end, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall allow debates, discussions, and deliberations upon issues and questions of interest and to decide, take actions, and arrive at the sense and will of its members.”
Collegiality within the Bangsamoro Parliament, as clearly evidenced by putting the goal of ascertaining the “will of the majority” on equal footing with the obligation “to preserve the rights of the minority” must be internalized by all BARMM political leaders at this early stage. Without a doubt, the removal of the majority-minority dynamic within the BTA is a huge blow against the inculturation of this parliamentary mentality amongst regional officials.
The truth is the existence of a strong opposition party or parties is one of the hallmarks of the parliamentary system. The opposition examines the government about its actions and policies. This is accomplished by debating government bills, asking ministers to explain their decisions during Question Hour and by examining government spending during parliamentary hearings.
By pointing out the errors of the government of the day, the opposition can compel it to make the necessary policy adjustments. However, it must be emphasized that the opposition mindset must never be to simply make the administration look bad or to stand in the way of its initiatives. It assumes the role of fiscalizer in order to ensure the cabinet perform its mandate without abuse of power or corruption.
Additionally, the opposition also needs to show that they are ready to assume the powers of government. Their raison d'être is not simply to oppose, as it were, but also to prove that in case the parliament is dissolved, they are ready with their own alternative policy proposals to present to the electorate in an election.
Obviously, the role of the opposition in the parliamentary context is profoundly unfamiliar to the BARMM electorate which have been accustomed to the presidential system. The patronage culture afflicting our politics also adds another layer of difficulty in learning this feature of parliamentarism. Hence, when the original BTA decided to start practicing the majority-minority dynamic in the parliamentary context, there was agreement in the BARMM that this was a very helpful learning tool for regional leaders as well as the Bangsamoro electorate.
Needless to say, the original BTA was not successful in consistently applying this parliamentary practice. But still, this fact alone cannot be used as justification for completely taking out the majority-minority dynamic in the new BTA. On the contrary, it is precisely the reason why this structure should have been maintained and with the added commitment to exert even more effort to integrate the practice in the normal work of the BARMM government.
In sum, the “one BTA” mentality may not be as healthy as it is being promoted. Extreme caution has to be applied here for the same not to become a path back to the highly centralized governance culture of a presidential system. The BTA should not lose sight of the collective goal of learning and internalizing parliamentary principles and protocols.
Hence, even though the “majority-minority” dynamic has been removed in the new BTA, an opposition voice should be allowed to evolve in the transitional Bangsamoro Parliament. The tendency to stifle debate and sideline dissent must be resisted. Indeed, the legislative process must accommodate both consensus and disagreement. Thus, a parliamentary side that represents the contrary view must have its space in this exercise.
The fact is, at this point the BARMM electorate must already have a working list of the basics of a parliamentary system. Hence, they are now looking at the BTA to exhibit some of these parliamentary features prescribed by the BOL. So plainly, it would be in the best interest of the BARMM if the BTA remains committed to laying the foundations for a vibrant Bangsamoro Parliament, where the role of the opposition/minority is as important as the government of the day.
Atty. Michael Henry Yusingco, LL.M is a Senior Research Fellow at the Ateneo School of Government. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Access Bangsamoro, its proponents, or affiliates.